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This paper addresses the question of a technical change in one the 
components of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP). Indeed, the 
SGP is composed of (1) a political commitment, (2) a preventive 
element, and (3) a dissuasive element, and an improvement of the 
SGP efficacy can come from any of these three components. In this 
paper the author proposes a new early warning procedure, part of 
the preventive element. The ideal situation would be for the 
European Commission to be able to identify countries at risk as 
soon as they vote their national budgets. Although this is not 
possible, as the measures of the deficit are based on GDP forecasts, 
the conclusion this paper makes is that the EC should avoid relying 
on GDP forecasts by calculating a reference index. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Six years of governance by the Treaty of Maastricht, followed by 
five years under the rules of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) 
seem to adequately demonstrate the positive externalities created by 
the European fiscal packages on European countries’ economies. 
However, some countries are breaching, or close to breaching the 
SGP. Using the revised numbers from Eurostat for Greece, the latter 
was above the 3% deficit ceiling since 2000. Portugal’s deficit in 
2001 was greater then 3%, followed by Germany's and France's 
from 2002 to 2004, as well as the subsequent breaches by Italy, 
U.K., and The Netherlands in 2004. 
 
The stake is different for countries belonging to the Economic and 
Monetary Union (EMU), in light of the necessity for economic 
policy coordination. During the convergence period from 1993 to 
late 1998, it appeared that some coordination rules were needed 
once the first European countries were ready to enter into the EMU. 
To this end, Germany, in 1995, proposed the Stability Pact in order 
to extend the positive effects of the convergence period, and to 
prevent countries from contracting their public spending during this 
period, only to increase it later on. First drafted in Madrid in 1995, 
heavily debated in Florence and Dublin in 1996, and accepted by 
France the same year, the SGP, now backed by the two largest 
countries of the forthcoming EMU, was adopted in Amsterdam in 
1997. 
 
The SGP consists of extensions of the fiscal package of the Treaty 
of Maastricht. To comply with the SGP countries may have a 
budget deficit within 3% of GDP, or public debt lower than 60% of 
GDP, although the latter criterion seems to have a weaker timbre. 
(The 3% rule is less arbitrary than people sometimes believe. With 
an average nominal growth rate of 5%, and a targeted inflation of 
2%, the real growth rate of 3% would balance the deficit of 3% of 
GDP).  
 
Formally, the SGP consists of three elements: first is a political 
commitment by all parties involved in the SGP (Commission, 
Member States, Council) to the full and timely implementation of 
the budget surveillance process (European Council 1997a).   3 
 
Second, there are preventive elements (European Council 1997c): 
(1) all Member States implement stability and convergence 
programmes; (2) there exists the possibility to trigger the “early 
warning” mechanism in the event of a significant slippage in the 
budgetary position of a Member State. The European Commission 
then makes recommendations to the Council. This has happened 
four times: 01/30/2002 for Portugal, and Germany; 11/19/2002 for 
France, and 04/28/2004 for Italy. 
 
Third, there are dissuasive elements ( European Council 1997b), 
which require Member States to take immediate corrective action 
and, if necessary, allow for the imposition of sanctions. If a country 
breaches the SGP, it exposes itself to penalties. These penalties are 
embodied in the SGP through article 104c of the Treaty of 
Maastricht via compulsory deposits that, after time, can be 
transformed into fines if governments do not take measures to 
decrease their deficits. The non-interest bearing deposits are made 
up of two elements: a fixed sum equal to 0.2% of GDP and a 
supplement of 0.1% of GDP for every percentage point by which 
the budget deficit exceeds the 3% reference level. Derogation is 
possible for “exceptional and temporary” circumstances, 
particularly in the case of a negative annual real growth rate. The 
exemption is automatic for countries if their GDP has declined by at 
least 2%, and if the excess deficit is temporary and small. Those 
countries in which the GDP has declined between 0.75% and 2% 
can also gain exemption from the rule with the consent of the 
Council. 
 
The paper is organized the following way: section 2 recalls the 
economic rationale of the SGP; section 3 studies the potential 
weaknesses of the SGP; and section 4 examines the index proposed 
to trigger an “early warning” earlier. 
 
 
2. The rationale of the Stability and Growth Pact 
 
Firstly, several researchers deal with the question of the 
sustainability of the budget deficit ( Bohn 1995, Mongelli 1999, 
Nielsen 1992, Perotti, Strauch and Von Hagen 1998), the bottom   4 
line of which, is preventing idle governments from hampering 
European growth. In 1999, Amador emphasized both the role of 
fiscal policy, and the behavior of the budget deficit and the public 
debt over time (Amador 1999) ; an important feature of this model 
was the defining of sources of uncertainty as “stochastic processes.” 
 
Secondly, there is a policy-mix argument ( Beetsma 2001), with 
other supporters of the SGP asserting that the advent of a central 
monetary authority was important in establishing the correct mix of 
fiscal and monetary policy in the Euro-zone (Issing 2002). 
 
Thirdly, and different slightly, is the question of fiscal coordination 
among member countries. Here, the issue is not coordinating the 
monetary policy with a country-specific fiscal policy, but rather 
coordinating fiscal policies collectively. A lack of coordination 
could lead to asymmetric economic shocks on both the aggregate 
demand and aggregate supply in every country, as well as hindering 
the European convergence. However, coordination is not 
synonymous with convergence (Krugman 1993). 
 
Fourth is the matter of free-riding. In 2002, Uhlig focused his 
discussion of free-riding and the SGP on the effects of centralized 
monetary policy combined with decentralized fiscal policy (Uhlig 
2002). Uhlig regards the SGP as essential in preventing free-riding 
in the form of excessively high deficits. The cause for concern over 
debt levels hinges on the independence of the central bank, because 
excessive levels of debt might lead to a crisis in which the ECB 
might be morally, although not legally, bound to bail out insolvent 
countries. This d efense of the SGP is not, however, without its 
opponents; a large share of the literature dissects the relationship 
between centralized monetary and decentralized fiscal policymakers, 
and finds that the SGP might not be needed under some conditions 
(Fourcans and Warin 2000, Leith and Wren-Lewis 2002, Vranceanu 
and Warin 2001). 
 
The fifth issue is moral hazard, which differs from free riding to the 
extent that it is “post-contractual opportunism.” In other words, 
once the pact is signed, countries’ loss functions change. Dixit and 
Lambertini demonstrate that fiscal discretion leads to equilibrium   5 
levels of output and inflation far different than Pareto-optimal 
choices (Dixit 2001, Dixit and Lambertini 2001). 
 
The sixth consideration is structural externalities. In order to abide 
by the fiscal rules of the SGP, countries are forced to make needed 
structural reforms (Warin 2003). These changes occur in the form 
of how much and how governments raise taxes, and how much and 
how they allocate public expenditures.  
 
A seventh reason is the maintenance of the credibility of the 
European central bank through insuring its leadership as the 
monetary authority. As noted by Buti and Van den Noord, the EMU 
is, “[commonly] seen as a regime of monetary leadership where 
fiscal policy is to support the central bank in its task to keep 
inflation in check,” (Buti and Van Den Noord 2004). This power is 
drawn from the following European Council resolution which 
accompanies the Pact: “[it] is also necessary to ensure that national 
budgetary policies support stability oriented monetary policies.” 
When the Maastricht Treaty was drafted, many observers believed 
that the European budgetary situation could undermine the 
credibility of the future European Central Bank ( Beetsma and 
Bovenberg 1995). If a country's fiscal situation becomes 
unsustainable, other countries might be forced to a bail out of the 
insolvent national government. Alternatively, the European Central 
Bank may be forced to monetize national debts, and i n so doing,  
create additional inflation in the EU. In 1999, Bolt summarizes this 
argument stating that, “It is in [the following] context that the Pact 
for Stability and Growth must be regarded: it seeks to supplement 
the common monetary policy framework within EMU with sound 
fiscal policies by the Member States so as to relieve the burden on 
the ECB’s monetary policy and to leave room for the operation of 
the automatic stabilizers,”
1  (Bolt 1999). Cooper and Kempf, 
nonetheless, call for some flexibility at the fiscal level, as the 
central bank lacks the tools necessary for stabilization in the 
presence of country specific shocks (Cooper and Kempf 2000). 
 
 
                                                   
1 Bolt (1999), p. 1.   6 
3. Some reasons why the SGP faces difficulties 
 
The question of free-riding is at the forefront of this issue. German 
and French advocacy of fiscal restraints, as well as their prominence 
relative to other European economies, makes it hard to believe that 
they intended to benefit from the others by running high deficits 
(Warin and Wolff 2004). 
 
Secondly, we must consider that the issue is not free riding, but 
rather a lack of political incentives (Buti and Van Den Noord 2004). 
Maastricht was tough on countries; any breach of the deficit rule, 
precluded their entrance. Yet, once a member of the EMU, a 
country understands that the letter of the SGP’s law is far looser 
than its spirit, and that some room for manoeuvring exists. Why 
does this interpretation exist? In contrast to Buti and Giudice in 
2002, we are not going to look for different political incentives 
within countries ( Buti and Giudice 2002), but rather take a look at 
the intent  of the SGP. In spirit, the SGP is tough on countries, 
having very fixed criteria for compliance. Yet, the application is 
more difficult than the criteria, and the dynamics of the pact 
generate unforeseen effects. Because the SGP is calculated over 
GDP and countries cannot know the precise level of future gross 
domestic products, it is almost impossible for countries to target a 
deficit of 3% GDP. Consequently, the SGP is an ex post facto rule. 
This characteristic makes it rather difficult, if not impossible, for a 
country to abide by the rule without knowing precisely what its end 
of the year GDP will be.
2 When a country decides its spending, it 
approximates its revenue by considering a forecast of the GDP 
growth rate. Hence, if for any reason the actual GDP is lower than 
the forcasted GDP,
3 the country may breach the pact. While it might 
be argued in defense of the pact that a country should choose a 
minimum margin approach instead of a truly optimistic one, 
political considerations make this improbable. Given the impact of 
economic language on people’s confidence, a policymaker may 
continue to forecast a higher GDP growth rate, and consider an 
actual deficit cap lower than the 3% rule. Politicians, however, for 
                                                   
2 For instance, France in 2002 breached the SGP with a deficit of 3.1% of GDP. 
3 See Jonung, L., Larch, M. 2004. Improving Fiscal Policy in the EU: The Case 
for Independent Forecasts. European Economy Economic Papers. 210.   7 
whom the life-cycle is very short, may consider the vagueness of 
such an approach a loophole. This intrinsic ex post facto feature of 
the SGP is one important reason why the political incentive to abide 
by the pact is reduced. 
 
 
4. A useful tool to trigger an early warning procedure  
 
The purpose of this section is to try to find a scenario that may be 
“easily” implemented, compared to other rules, to respond to the 
many demands from the economic literature. 
 
One can try to give the benefit of the doubt to European countries’ 
policymakers, as the implementation of the SGP is not easy. The 
SGP is based an ex post facto measure of the GDP, relying on the 
forecasting capacity of the national administration, or  its ability to 
fine-tune its spending – something that is almost impossible once 
the budget is voted. Implicitly, if the administration is not certain of 
its GDP forecast, it should target lower spending in order to abide 
by the rule. Yet, this introduces some unfairness in the rule across 
countries, as well as ambiguity. If the scale of the  error is minor, 
ambiguity in the policy making is not desirable. Indeed, a country 
can always take a chance hoping that the actual GDP will be higher 
than the forecast.  
 
A realistic and effective response  would be to issue an early 
warning earlier! In that respect, the European Commission needs a 
useful tool to identify the riskier budgets very early, and ideally, as 
soon as they are voted by the national parliaments. In order to do so, 
the EC should take into consideration the issues in the Pact 
definition, and simulate a virtual SGP (SGP II). The simulated SGP 
could consist of (1) keeping the deficit rule, (2) enforcing the debt 
criterion of the SGP, and (3) calculating the 3% deficit based on the 
GDP introducing a lag of one year. 
 
In doing so during the first quarter or 2001, the EC would have a 
better approximation of a country's GDP for 2000 than in early 
2000.  Over the summer of 2001, the country works on its budget, 
knowing exactly how much to spend in billions of euros, and pushes   8 
for its acceptance by the national parliament in late 2001.  This 
figure would serve as an index. 
 
Consequently, if the EC sees that the actual deficit is greater than 
the index using the SGP II procedure, it shows that the country is at 
risk of breaching the deficit ceiling. The EC could group the 
countries at risk according to this index, and issue earlier during the 
current year, an “early warning.” 
 
The legal basis for such an “early warning” is Article 99(4) (ex 
Article 103(4)) of the EC Treaty, which allows for the Council, 
acting by a qualified majority on a recommendation from the 
Commission, to address a recommendation to any Member State 
diverging from the medium-term budgetary objective. Acting 
through a qualified majority of all Member States (including the 
Member State concerned), the Council may decide to make its 
recommendation public. One of the advantages of the index is that it 
puts a number on the “medium-term budgetary objective.” 
 
The technical change would work the following way: the country 
would use the 2000 GDP as a reference value to calculate the 2002 
deficit. A country would still use a GDP forecast to approximate the 
changes in expenditure and revenue, but the EC would calculate the 
“deficit reference value” in euros using the new “GDP reference 
value.” Obviously, the actual amount of the public revenue, as well 
as the actual amount of the public expenditure in 2002 would rely 
on the 2002 GDP. 
 
In case of positive GDP growth rates – slowdown or not compared 
to the previous year – there is no issue, since the 2002 GDP will be 
higher than the index that serves as a “2000 GDP reference value”. 
 
In a recession two possibilities would occur. First, if the 2002 GDP 
is lower than the 2000 GDP that is used to calculate the index, then 
a larger deficit divided by a lower GDP would render the country in 
breach of the 3% ceiling. Although the index would not have put 
the country in the group at risk, we should keep in mind that a 
country can still breach the deficit ceiling two years in a row.  
   9 
Second, if the 2002 GDP is lower than 2001, but not 2000, it is 
likely that there is no issue again. The index that serves as a 
“reference value for the 2002 deficit” was calculated in euros by 
taking 3% over the 2000 GDP reference value. If the 2002 deficit in 
euros was greater than the deficit based upon the index, because of 
automatic stabilizers, then even a minor positive growth rate from 
2000 to 2002, in terms of GDP and considering the size of the GDP, 
would likely compensate for the discrepancy in the deficit. If not, 
the country is still allowed to breach the ceiling two years in a row. 
 
For instance, in looking at the following table (see Table 1), we see 
that Germany, Greece, France, and Italy face an improvement in 
their GDP levels from 2000 to 2003. Furthermore, Greece breaches 
the deficit ceiling from 2000 to 2003. Germany and France breach 
the deficit ceiling in 2002, and 2003. If we calculate the deficit 
under the simulated SGP (SGP II) in 2002 using the index value 
from the ante penultimate year, we see that the index that would 
have triggered an early warning for Germany would have been         
-60.90 billion euros as opposed to the  –77.97 billion euros when 
Germany realised the issue.  
   10 







In retrospect, the economic literature often looks at the SGP from a 
severe perspective; as it faces difficulties, however, economists 
should find a more optimal fiscal rule. If the SGP faces issues, it 
comes also from its design. 
 
The SGP is an economic rule embedded in an economic policy for 
its implementation. The SGP, as an economic policy, has three 
features: (1) a political commitment, (2) a preventive part, and (3) a 
dissuasive element. Here, the author addressed the question of how 
to improve the preventive part. The calculation of an index helps the 
EC in the identification of countries that are at risk of breaching the   11 
deficit ceiling. In other words, this index provides a useful tool that 
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